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The potential mutation of the Sub-Prime banking crisis into a sovereign debt one in Euro area 
countries is investigated. After reviewing the criteria used to measure the debt vulnerability, 
the balance sheet approach (BSA) is presented in order to illustrate the potential connections 
between these two types of crises. A graphical analysis yields evidence that at the end 2009 
the probability of observing a Euro area country defaulting is less likely than six month 
before. Nevertheless, the serious threats, which concern Greece and Ireland, do not permit us 
to exclude the occurrence of a contagious, or self-fulfilling, sovereign debt or currency crises 
in Euro area in the future. 
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Since the beginning of the year 2010, more and more voices proclaim that the
Sub-Prime banking crisis has entered its last stage of infection. After hitting the
U.S. real estate markets, the banking sector, and the stock exchange markets
all over the world, it is aecting for a while the real sector (unemployment, in
particular), before hopefully disappearing. As a virus, it might then be frozen
for a while, before stemming back again. But as economic systems learned
from this event, they will be stronger and hopefully immune from this new
virus. Nevertheless, some concerns remain about the possible mutation and
resurgence of the crisis in another type of turmoil. For example, in November
30, 2009 in the Korean Times, Kenneth Rogo wrote that "Essentially, there
is still a risk that the nancial crisis is simply hibernating as it slowly morphs
into a government debt crisis". It is also important to notice this potential fear
is not simply limited to emerging economies, such as Dubai or Ukraine, or third
world countries but also concerns industrialized countries as well. In particular,
the threat of a sovereign debt crisis is present for Euro area members, such
as Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. This regional dispersion constitutes a
specicity of the current crisis,3 as episodes in which a European country was in
default are historically extremely rare (for example, Reinhart and Rogo (2009)
only list 13 of these periods in Spain since 1476, and 8 in France since 943!!).
Moreover, the adoption of a single currency and the various agreements related
to it, such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), should have avoided the
occurrence of such debt default episodes.
Recent literature has widely examined the potential linkages between a cur-
rency and a banking crisis, to assess the likelihood of a twin crisis. Typically,
a sharp collapse on exchange rate markets endangers nancial investments and
may lead to liquidity problems, and even bankruptcy of nancial institutions.
Similarly, the consequences of scal imbalances for currency/banking crises has
been largely investigated. The seminal model of Flood and Garber (1984), pro-
3See Reinhart and Rogo (2009) for an exhaustive list of its specicities.
2vides a theoretical explanation for the occurrence of a currency crisis stemming
from incoherent macroeconomic policies, and in particular an uncontrolled mon-
etary expansion, which can be easily extended for monetized excessive public
decits (see inter alii, Corsetti and Mackowiak, 2006). On the contrary, only few
papers have scrutinized the potential mutation of banking crises into sovereign
debt ones. Three types of linkages can be established. In a rst instance, in re-
action to a banking crisis, governments set up safety plans leading to an increase
in public decits. Financial institutions can also be supported by o-balance
sheet operations such as government guarantees to commercial banks. The scal
cost of the latter measure is dicult to evaluate as there is no direct liquidity
support, but the risk associated with the potential exercise of the guarantee
leads investors to ask a higher risk premium from the country or institution
providing the insurance. Finally, the real consequences associated with the
banking crisis (higher unemployment,...) aect government tax revenues, which
will shrink, and government spending, which will rise, through social security
(unemployment benets,..) and through measures designed to stimulate global
demand. This automatic stabilizer mechanism deepens the budget decit and
increases the debt, calling for even more procyclical discretionary scal policies.
This mechanism is particularly important for members of the European Mone-
tary Union that committed themselves to limiting their scal decits and debt
in the SGP. As a consequence, this restrictive scal policy could increase the
probability of default for households, increasing the amount on non-performing
loans, again putting tensions on the banks' balance sheet.
Empirically, Reinhart and Rogo (2008a,b) even portrayed this lack of em-
pirical studies relating banking and debt crises as 'a forgotten story', and pro-
posed a historical analysis beginning in 1900 for a large set of developed and
industrialized countries. They report for each year the proportion of banking
and debt crisis episodes. It turns out that nancial sector turbulences had con-
sequences for sovereign default crisis, increasing the likelihood of the Sub-Prime
crisis to mute into sovereign debt problems.
The main reason for the relative lack of empirical studies lies in the diculty
3to diagnose the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. The strict denition stating
that a country is facing a debt crisis, when it cannot pay for the interest or the
principal of its foreign debt, is much too restrictive and would leave us with
the impression that none of the European countries are facing a crisis at the
moment. Similarly, providing a debt threshold beyond which a sovereign debt
crisis is detected is also not operational in practice, as it would have to be
country specic. For example, as Euro area countries have a stable currency
and are likely to assist each other in case of diculty in paying debt services, the
threshold beyond which a Euro area country experiences a sovereign debt crisis
would be higher than for a non-member country. For example, Italy and Greece
were experiencing public debt exceeding 100% of the gross domestic product
(gdp) without being in a formal crisis situation. For the detection of a sovereign
debt crisis, one could also rely on agency ratings (Moodys or Standard and
Poors), or on the spread between government bond interest rate of a country
and that of a virtuous one (usually Germany or the U.S.) as this spread provides
a direct indication of the renancing costs for a government on a market. A
country, with a higher risk of default, faces a higher renancing cost of public
decits. In fact, these three measures are indicators of the debt vulnerability of
the country.
The paper intends to shed some light on the potential linkages between
banking and sovereign crises. It is intended to provide a better understanding
of the potential mutation of the Sub-Prime turmoil into a sovereign debt crisis
in the Euro area. Section 2 is devoted to the denition of a sovereign debt crisis.
In Section 3, a balance sheet approach is used to explain the linkages between
banking and debt crises. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of the current
situation for Euro area countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 Denitions
The relative scarcity of studies relating banking to debt crises is mainly due
to the problems of providing operational denitions of these events, and in
4particular the timing and duration of debt crisis.
Intuitively, a country facing problems with the payment of the interest or the
principal of its foreign debt, experiences a crisis on external sovereign debt. In
other words, during a debt crisis, the country faces defaulting its debt services
like an  a part enti ere household. Nevertheless, although such a denition of a
debt crisis has the advantage of simplicity, it is much too narrow to be used as
an operational tool to detect a debt crisis in an early stage, which would allow
for taking measures to avoid defaulting. Dening a debt crisis as a period of
debt-services default for a specic country would lead to detecting only a few
crises, with the most extreme ones corresponding to ocial defaults (Russia 1998
or Argentina, 2001). In practice, countries rarely ocially announce that they
are defaulting, since the consequences for their credibility would be disastrous.
According to Moody's Investors Service (2003), only seven rated sovereign bond
issuers would have defaulted on their foreign currency-denominated bonds since
1985, and all those defaults occurred between 1998 and 2002. For example, the
famous Brazilian "crisis" in 1994 95 would not have been labeled a debt crisis,
despite the substantial IMF assistance, as it did not result in sovereign default.
A rst direct indicator of a debt crisis would be an important increase in the
ratio of public debt-gdp. Beyond a certain threshold, one would conclude that a
country is facing a problem in nancing the debt service. Even if this quantity
based measure is relatively simple, nevertheless it neglects the cost of the debt:
in some cases, it is better to have a high debt at a low cost than a low debt at
a high rate. Moreover, the threshold beyond which a crisis is detected depends
on the country: The recent literature on debt (See Reinhart et al. 2003 and
Manasse et al., 2003) shows that developing countries historically have run into
problems at much lower debt-to-output ratios than advanced countries. One of
the reasons is that investors might have more condence in a developed country
with high debt, than a developing one with low debt. For such a reason, a debt
crisis is hardly detected in Japan, where the debt-gdp ratio is reaching 200%
whereas Uruguay experienced a debt crisis in 2002 when this ratio was close
to 100%. Finally, debt statistics are extracted from national accounts. They
5are therefore potentially revisable until 2 years after their rst publication, and
consequently early releases have to be interpreted with caution.
Market-based measures appear then more adequate as countries can nd
sucient liquidity on sovereign bond markets, under the condition that capital
is mobile. These markets developed in the 1990's fueled up with public debt and
made it relatively easy for a country facing debt-servicing diculties to issue
bonds to cover its liquidity demand. Nevertheless, a country with a high risk
of default should expect to reward investors with a consequent risk premium,
leading to higher renancing costs. Again, the similarity with a household is
obvious: if you ask for a loan and show the bank that you have enough nancial
capacities to pay it back, the cost of the loan will be low. The renancing
rate is a good proxy of the investors feeling for the sustainability of a country's
sovereign debt, especially for countries having the same currency.4 Pescatori
and Sy (2007) thus use the bond spread between risky and less risky countries
as an indicator of tension on the sovereign bond market. Once this spread
crosses a certain threshold,5 a debt crisis is diagnosed. Using this criterion, the
number of crises jumps to 168 for the period 1975   1993!
Another possibility consists in relying on rating agencies (such as Stan-
dard and Poors, Fitch or Moodys) and adopting rating-based measures of the
sovereign debt crisis. Rating agencies evaluate the risk associated with sovereign
debt, ranking them in several groups. The risk models are specic, most of the
time based on expert's judgments and thus may vary from one agency to an-
other.6 Moreover, as the ranking is discrete, the consequences of a downgrading
are strong. Just to give an example, the announcement of a future downgrading
of the Greek sovereign bond on February 24, 2010 caused a decrease of 2% in
most of European stock markets. Rating agencies are thus up or downgrading
with prudence,7 especially when it concerns a developed country, to avoid pro-
4In the cases, of countries with dierent currencies, the renancing rate also integrates the
currency risk.
5Sy (2004) estimates a value around 1;000 basis points for a set of emerging countries.
6See Cantor and Packer (1995).
7The question of the political independence of these rating agencies can also been raised,
as they are mainly nanced by developed countries.
6voking the precipitation of the crisis. The prudence leads to the introduction of
important delays in the crisis dating, and to overestimate inertia for some coun-
tries. To illustrate this point, we report in Figure 2 the path of the debt to GDP
ratio, the sovereign ratings, and the government bond spread for 11 European
countries,8 which belong to the Euro area and the United Kingdom for the pe-
riod 2000 2009. Debt series were extracted from the database AMECO from
the European Commission, while the sovereign ratings were provided by Stan-
dard and Poors (S&P).9 The government bond yields (usually 10 years) were
taken the IFS database of the IMF, and the spreads were calculated considering
Germany as the reference country. All series are at the yearly frequency.
It turns out that sovereign ratings are constant over the period for half of
the countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the
U.K.).10 Only Portugal has been downgraded to a higher risk group. For this
reason, this measure will not be used in the rest of the paper. Debt-gdp ratios
show a lower inertia, and exhibit a negative trend before the Sub-Prime crisis.
Since 2007, they strongly increase, reaching in 2009 a level higher than in 2000.
Government bond spreads are as volatile as the debt-gdp ratio. Interestingly, it
turns out that the turning point for spreads took place around 2006, i.e. a year
before the increase in the debt-gdp ratio. Such an observation is not surprising
at all, as these risk premiums are determined by the markets, which integrate
quickly and even anticipate news.
3 The linkages between banking and debt crises
3.1 The balance sheet approach (BSA)
Theoretical models of nancial crisis combine dynamic relationships (as uncov-
ered interest rate parity, money demand) representing a ows approach, and
8Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the U.K.
9Data are taken from Slavila (2008). For Greece, instead of the S&P sovereign debt rating,
we reported Moody's rating.
10Five out of these six countries have a constant AAA rate and thus belong to the lowest
risk group.
7Figure 1: Debt-gdp ratio, Government bond spread and sovereign debt ratings
8accounting quantities (such as debt, foreign reserves,...) indicating stock vari-
ables, and reported in balance sheets of the government and the central bank.
As an example, the Flood and Garber (1984) model for currency crisis includes
three well-known log-linearized equations (money demand, uncovered interest
rate parity, purchasing power parity)and an accounting relation from the from
balance sheet of the central bank consolidated with that of the government.
The determinants of real money demand are real domestic income, assumed
to be exogenous, and nominal domestic interest rates. Purchasing power par-
ity links the ratio of the domestic and the foreign price level to the nominal
exchange rate. Uncovered interest rate parity relates the domestic to foreign
nominal interest rate dierential to the expected nominal exchange rate change,
where expectations are assumed to be model-based (perfect foresight or ratio-
nal). The nominal money supply is the only policy variable. From the central
bank's balance sheet, it results that the monetary basis equals the book value
of international reserves plus domestic credit. The central bank monetizes the
scal branch's credit demand. If the consolidated government is printing money
to nance government expenditures in a xed exchange rate regime or in a mon-
etary union (like the Euro area), the central bank can use up its foreign currency
reserves to soak up any money the public does not want to hold at the xed
exchange rate. But such a policy would not be sustainable as the central bank
will run out of foreign reserves, at which point it is not longer in a position
to both nance the government decits and to keep the money stock and the
exchange rate xed. Of course, the central bank could borrow foreign reserves
for a while but at the cost of a higher risk premium,11 but this policy would
not be sustainable. Fiscal austerity is the only remedy in such a situation, as
long as the abandonment of the xed exchange rate (in the case of European
Monetary Union, it would consist in abandoning the Euro) is not considered. If
it not the case, a crisis will arise from mismatches within the asset-liability part
of the central bank balance sheet: the currency crisis situation corresponding to
the case where the foreign reserves stock is exhausted in the asset part. In the
11This policy is denominated as sterilization.
9Euro area, the room for policy discretion is further reduced by the European
treaty, prohibiting the European Central Bank (ECB) to lend to member state
governments.
The Flood and Garber (1984) model considers exclusively the central bank
balance sheet and thus it can only investigate the mechanism leading to currency
crisis. In order to apprehend the potential mutation of a particular crisis into
another type, BSA identies next to the central bank three important balance
sheets, associated respectively with the nancial sector (banks), the non nan-
cial sector (rms and households), and the external sector. Figure 2 reports the
potential linkages found by Rosenberg et al. (2005).
Figure 2: Balance sheet approach (Source: Rosenberg et al., 2005, p.5)
The concordance with Flood and Garber (1984) is done with the government
sector balance, which includes the one of the central bank. Any shock to a
specic balance sheet will have an eect on the other ones. As an example, the
negative shock on the U.S. real estate price that has aected the non-nancial
balance sheet sector has been transmitted to the nancial sector balance sheet
(e.g. insolvency of households leads to losses for banks), and to the government
one (e.g. reduction of tax income resulting from rm and household insolvency).
10Similarly a bank panic will hit the nancial sector balance sheet rst, but also
the government's one via a decrease in the demand for government bonds. The
(direct or indirect) impact of the shock will be more important the weaker the
balance sheet is, i.e. the bigger the mismatch is. Rosenberg et al. (2005) nd 3
types of mismatches: the currency mismatch (a higher amount of assets labeled
in foreign currency creates a vulnerability to exchange rate shocks12), maturity
mismatch (when long-run assets are excessive vis a vis of short run ones, the
balance sheet is vulnerable to an increase in interest rates, as it increases the
rolling over short-run liabilities) and market risks (a decrease in the price of an
asset to which the balance sheet is over-exposed).
Using this BSA framework, it is thus possible to detect potential sources at
the origin of the Sub-Prime banking crisis as the market risk (too high exposure
of the nancial sector balance sheet to real estate sector), and a maturity mis-
match (too high proportion of long term loans, mortgage in particularly, in the
liability part of the nancial sector balance sheet), which lead to a bank panic.
Similarly, BSA suggests one potential weakness fostering the transmission of
the banking to a sovereign debt crisis consecutive to the contraction of the asset
part of the nancial sector balance sheet. It leads to a lower demand for public
bonds, forcing government to enter massively the foreign bond markets, dete-
riorating thereby their external debt position. For a member of the Euro area
countries, a deterioration of the debt position would lead to pay a default risk
premium.
3.2 Empirical evidence
Several papers evaluate the potential transmission of a banking crisis into a
currency one (Glick and Hutchinson, 2000 for example13).
12The adoption of a single currency in the Euro area should limit this type of risk.
13They study the joint occurrence of banking and currency crises using the probit approach
on a set of annual data of 90 developed and developing economies over 20 years from 1975
to 1997. They rst estimate two probit equations, one for each type of crisis, and test em-
pirically the causal link between crises by means of a contemporaneous and a lagged dummy
variable. After controlling for the inuence of a set of macro variables, they nd a signicant
contemporaneous eect of currency crises in the banking distress equation, and signicant
contemporaneous and lagged eects of banking crises in the currency pressure equation in the
11Interestingly, the linkages between banking and sovereign crises have been
less investigated. However, several papers stress the ever growing real cost of
banking crises. Bordo et al. (2001) found that the occurrence of a banking crisis
increased since 1973 and their frequency is the same for emerging as developed
countries.14 They also showed that the real costs of banking crises have been
increasing since the end of the 1970's and exceed those induced by a currency
crisis. Indeed, it is likely that higher real costs will foster the mutation of the
banking crisis into a sovereign debt one. Using an elaborated econometric model
for a sample of 24 emerging countries, Hutchinson and Noy (2006) conrm the
outcomes of Bordo et al. (2001), nding that a banking crisis is on average
followed by a 4:1% fall in real output growth and a recession lasting for two
years.15 DellAriccia et al. (2008) go deeper and show that sectors more depen-
dent on external nance perform relatively worse during banking crises and this
too applies to countries with less access to foreign nance.16
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on links between banking and sovereign
debt crises is weaker. Hutchinson and Noy (2006) for example do not nd
any signicant direct eects on the public budget decit, which represents an
approximation of the growth rate of debt, after a banking crisis. On the contrary,
Reinhart and Rogo (2008a,b) consider the linkage in a historical analysis since
1900. They analyse a set of 66 countries and determine ex-post the proportion
of banking and debt crises for every year. In Figure 3, they report for each year
the number of countries experiencing a banking and debt crisis and support the
nding that sovereign debt episodes are following a banking crisis.
According to their estimates the stock of debt on average almost doubles
(exactly multiplies by 1:86) three years after the banking crisis. Of course, the
debt eect depends on the country considered and on several factors such as its
emerging economies sub-sample.
14Reinhart and Rogo (2008a) detected one banking crisis for EMU countries since 1945,
but two in Spain and Germany. In the same period the United Kingdom experienced 4 of
them.
15In the cases of currency crises they nd that it follows a recession of one year, resulting
in a decrease in output of 1:3%).
16This matches the BSA links: in case of a banking crisis, nancial sector demand less
government bonds leading the government to ask for more liquidity on the external sector.
12Figure 3: Historical evolution of debt/banking crisis. Source: Reinhart and
Rogo (2008a) p.10
initial amount of debt and its access to the foreign bond market. Interestingly,
European countries are not always below the average of the debt-gdp ratio (e.g.
Spain) stressing hence the debt vulnerability of these economies to a banking
crisis.
A reverse eect (from debt to banking crisis) has also been established by
Borensztein and Panizza (2008). Considering 149 countries for the 1975-2000
period, they diagnose 111 banking and 85 sovereign debt crises and they estimate
that the risk to face a banking crisis after experiencing a sovereign debt crisis
increases by 11% compared to a normal situation.
4 The 2008 Sub-Prime crisis
4.1 Facts
The Sub-Prime crisis takes its origin in the explosion of the real estate bubble
in the U.S. in mid 2007. As the amount of assets linked to real estate, which
were held by nancial institutions was important and as these assets were of-
ten packaged in undiversied high risk, so-called structured products, banks
and insurances presented weak balance sheets. Some nancial institutions were
experiencing liquidity problems and were already helped by governmental au-
thorities (Northern Rock, ..). In September 2008, Lehman Brothers went into
13bankruptcy provoking a 2-week tsunami on stock markets. The inter-banking
market stopped functioning, and governments were forced to intervene in order
to stabilize the banking sector. These interventions have been carried out via
on-balance sheet operations (capital injections, purchase of assets and liquidity
provision by treasury and central bank support provided with treasury backing
or by the central bank) and o-balance sheet guarantees. As shown in Table
1,17 the amount spent on these safety plans by European countries belonging
to the G20 were important, especially with respect to the guarantees, which do
not appear in the government's balance sheet, but will be a risk factor in case
they will be exercised. U.K. is the country, which provided the highest direct
support to the nancial sector (mainly via nationalization) in percent of gdp
whereas the Netherlands oered the highest amounts of guarantees.
Table 1: Financial sector scal costs in % of GDP
Capital Purchase of Central Bank Liquidity
Injections Assets and Lending Support Provision Guarantees
and Lending Provided with by Central Bank
by Treasury Treasury Backing
France 1.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 16.4
Germany 3.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 17.6
Italy 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0
Netherlands 3.4 2.8 0.0 0.0 33.7
Spain 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 18.3
U.K. 3.5 13.8 12.9 0.0 17.4
Source: IMF, 2009. The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium - Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis.
Governments used the sovereign bond markets to support these plans and to
nance the recessionary real eects implied by the banking crisis. As a result,
sovereign debt (measured by the debt-gdp ratio) jumped from 62 percent of
World GDP in 2007 to 85% in 2009 and according to the IMF projections it is
expected to rise to 118% for G20 countries in 2014. Similarly, the average scal
decit in the G20 jumped from 1 to 7:9% in the same period of time.
The consequences of the Sub-Prime crisis of the debt vulnerability for Euro-
17Source: IMF, 2009. 'The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium - Term Policies
After the 2008 Crisis'.
14pean countries can be directly observed via the evolution of the debt-gdp ratio.
Data are extracted from the AMECO database of the European Commission.
These yearly data are available until 2010. Notice that the 2010 data is not
observed, but forecasted in the legal framework established by the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Table 2 gathers the debt-gdp ratio as well as its yearly growth rate for the
period 2007   2010.
Table 2: Debt-GDP ratio
growth rate in % levels in %
Period 07-08 08-09 09-10* 08 09
Austria (Aus) 5.33 10.30 7.02 62.64 69.10
Belgium (Bel) 6.66 8.14 4.16 89.85 97.16
France (Fra) 5.63 12.90 8.42 67.39 76.09
Germany (Ger) 1.41 10.91 5.00 65.89 73.08
Greece (Gre) 3.79 13.50 10.98 99.19 112.57
Ireland (Ire) 75.36 49.33 25.98 44.08 65,83
Italy (Ita) 2.16 8.31 1.84 105.77 114.56
Luxembourg (Lux) 105.12 10.87 9.24 13.54 15.01
Netherlands (Net) 27.94 2.77 9.67 58.18 59.79
Portugal (Por) 4.24 16.70 9.27 66.32 77.39
Spain (Spa) 9.81 36.67 22.18 39.70 54.25
U.K. (UK) 17.64 31.96 17.03 52.00 68.62
Note: Data corresponds to the general government consolidated
gross debt, reported in the framework of the excessive decit pro-
cedure (based on ESA 1995) (UDGG). Observations for 2010 are
European Commission forecasts and revisions are possible two
years after the rst publication.
In 2009, the stock of debt exceeded 100% for Italy and Greece, and is in all
cases larger than the 60% threshold imposed by the SGP. Similarly, the debt-gdp
ratio increased for almost all countries, except Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Spain. The debt growth rate is thus positive in all Euro area since 2008.
The highest variation is observed for the period 2008   2009. Nevertheless, it
seems that a peak has been reached in 2009 as debt growth rates are expected
to decrease from 2010 onward. We also remark a negative relationship between
the level and the debt growth rate, indicating that countries with an important
stock of debt experienced a lower increase in their debt-gdp ratio.
15The expected consequence of the deterioration of the public debt is that
investors are requiring higher risk premiums. The government bond spread
should thus exhibit a similar pattern as the debt. Figure 4 represents its monthly
path since January 2008. Again the spread is calculated as the deviation from
the German 10 year government bond interest rate.18
Figure 4: Recent evolution of the government bond spread wrt Germany
Indeed, it appears that the spreads rose during the rst semester of 2009
exceeding 1% dierentials for all countries except for Austria, the Netherlands,
18Data are extracted from the I.F.S. Database of the IMF.
16France and the U.K. It almost jumped to 3% for Greece and Ireland, which
seem to be the countries that are the most likely to default according to nan-
cial market reactions. After mid-2009, the spreads fall again crossing back the
1% point dierential indicating that tensions on sovereign debt, and thus the
probability for a European country to default, is consequently lower than in the
early 2009. Greece and Ireland constitute the exceptions, where risk premium
is substantially going up again at the end of the year 2009. Government bond
spreads also slightly rose for a group of countries inluding Portugal. So, markets
are considering that the situation is getting tenser for these countries. It is no-
ticeable that spreads are below the 1;000 bps threshold, a criterion proposed by
Pescatory and Sy (2007) to detect a sovereign debt crisis in emerging countries.
It indicates that the market still believes that the situation in Greece and Ire-
land is not alarming possibly because markets might be condent that they will
be supported by other Euro area member states if necessary. Other countries
like Spain and Portugal also experienced an increase in their government bond
spread in 2009. Their spread has also decreased substantially during the second
half 2009, which has subsequently increased again.
In order to investigate the link between the Sub-Prime crisis and the debt
vulnerability (or the probability of sovereign debt crisis), we consider 3 indica-
tors of the recent banking crisis: the total scal costs of the safety plans of the
banking sector, the amount of guarantees provided by the state to the nancial
sector, and the decrease of the stock market index in 2008.19 Figures 5 to 7
indicate the link that may prevail between these 3 measures and the indica-
tors of sovereign debt crises (debt-gdp ratio and the government bond spread in
2009). It turns out that no clear link is observed when considering total scal
costs of the safety plans of the banking sector or the guarantees provided by
governments to the nancial sector. The amount of support does not depend on
the debt situation of the country. This result is not surprising when considering
the guarantees, as they do not correspond to any direct costs as long as they
19Fiscal cost data are extracted from the IMF's (2009) report on "The State of Public Fi-
nances: Outlook and Medium - Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis", stock exchange variations
in 2008 are calculated using the datastream stock market local indices.
17are not exercised (except for the possibility that as a result of the support, the
guarantor might have to pay a risk premium on its loans). With respect to the
scal costs induced by the banking saving plan, they do not seem to have had
much impact on the debt.20 This conclusion provides ex-post a motivation for
the decision of European governments to support the banking sector to avoid
its collapse.
On the contrary, a positive relationship can be detected between stock mar-
ket losses and debt-gdp ratio (or government bond spread): countries facing the
highest stock markets losses, are also the ones experiencing the highest debt-gdp
ratio and the highest risk premium. It is possible to explain theoretically this
linkage21 with a wealth eect (a decrease in stock market index leads to a neg-
ative wealth shock, having a negative impact on demand, implying a decrease
in scal income and thus a degradation of the debt stock relative to the gdp)
amplied by a decrease in output.
Figure 5: Banking saving plan and sovereign debt crisis
4.2 Remaining threats
This graphical empirical analysis leaves us with the feeling that the increase in
debt vulnerability observed in European countries is more driven by stock mar-
ket losses than government interventions aimed at rescuing the banking sector.
20A similar conclusion can be reached when considering the growth rate of debt instead of
its level.
21Formal tests should be implemented to assess the direction of the causality.
18Figure 6: Guarantee to banks and sovereign debt crisis
Figure 7: Stock market growth and sovereign debt crisis
19This constitutes a positive indication for the coming months as stock markets
have been recovering since mid 2009. The previous gures also indicate that
the situation is on the way to be normalized after the early 2009 turbulences,
as the spread with respect to the German government bond is shrinking again
and the debt forecasts for 2010 seem to indicate a lower debt growth rate for
2010.
Nevertheless, potential threats are still present:
First, some countries, Greece in particular, to a lesser extent Ireland, are
still problematic. With respect to Greece, the debt-gdp ratio is far above 100%
and is expected to increase by 10% in 2010. Concerning Ireland, debt is much
lower (around 65%) but its growth rate is the highest in the Euro area (50%
this year and still 25% for 2010). As a consequence government spread for these
two countries is increasing again vis a vis of all other Euro area members. The
threat lies in the potential default of one of these countries. In such a case, it
would be likely22 to observe a spill-over of the crisis to all Euro area countries.
Second, governments have provided guarantees to the nancial sectors. It
helped the markets to regain condence and to save the banking sector from a
global collapse. Nevertheless, as some guarantees remain eective (via private-
public partnerships or simply via nationalization as in the UK) they constitute
a potential threat. In the case of a country default, banks holding government
bonds, may face huge losses which have to be covered by governments. Investor
condence in Euro governments solvency would diminish causing an inevitable
contagious transmission of the sovereign debt crisis.
Third, as stressed by Sgherri and Zoli (2009), a huge part of the dynamics
of Euro area sovereign spreads is driven by common shocks. It thus means
that a crisis will likely be systemic rather than country-specic. Moreover,
even if spreads are converging again between Euro area countries, they could
disconnect from the U.S. or Japanese government bonds interest rates. In such
a case, the Euro would be under pressure, depreciating vis a vis of the US$ and
22The contagion phenomenon will be amplied by the high nancial and trade interde-
pendence between these countries, as well as by a likely collapse in investors' sentiments in
Europe.
20the Japanese Yen. The sovereign debt crisis would mute then into a currency
crisis. Even if the Euro has recently lost value with respect to the US$, the
interest rate spread between German and U.S. government bonds are stable
around 0:2% since mid October. Moreover, from a historical perspective the
value of the Euro is still fairly high compared to the US$. The likelihood of a
currency crisis remains nevertheless a potential threat.
Fourth, all the debates around the probable default of a Euro area country
could create the conditions for some speculators to generate a self-fullling cur-
rency or debt crisis (see Obstfeld, 1996 for a theoretical model of self-fullling
currency crisis). The mechanism behind such an event is simple: as the mar-
kets are uncertain about the probability of default of a country, any devastating
news23 may provoke a massive sell of domestic government bonds, leading to
the impossibility for the government of renancing and thus to a sovereign debt
crisis.
Finally, the Euro area may face serious institutional problems in the case of
the default of one of his members. From a legal point of view, the Maastricht
treaty contains a no-bail out clause that restricts the ways to provide support
to a member country facing default. A legal obligation to provide support
is explicitly ruled out. Such an article was included to avoid moral hazard:
if systematic help is provided to decient governments, they will one day or
another take advantage of the situation. Nevertheless, as the risk of contagion
of a sovereign debt crisis would be important and as it is neither conceivable nor
legally possible to exclude a member country from the Euro area, de Grauwe
(2009) invokes Art. 100 of the Maastricht treaty, to allow EU governments to
freely bail-out a country if needed. Such an intervention could nevertheless not
be implemented via the ECB, which contrary to the U.S. Federal reserve system,
is not allowed to intervene and nance the decit encountered by a member
country. ECB's possibilities of action are limited to acceptance of bonds as
collateral for new loans. So to face liquidity problems and to avoid the rescue
23For example, a simple interview of George Sorros initiated the speculative attack against
the British Pound in 1992.
21by a non-European lender as the IMF, some voices already call for the creation
of a European Monetary Fund. Anyway, even if the threat of a sovereign debt
crisis disappears, European authorities cannot ignore anymore the possibility
of such an event in the future and thus they will have to reassess the legal
framework for a common intervention in the light of the crises experiences.
5 Conclusion
This paper's objective is to shed some light on and to contribute to, the under-
standing of the causes of a possible mutation of the Sub-Prime crisis into that of
a sovereign debt crisis. After presenting the dierent criteria used to dene and
measure the debt vulnerability, the balance sheet approach (BSA) is presented
in order to illustrate the connections between the dierent types of crises and
the mechanisms propagating a crisis and possibly igniting the next one. In the
empirical part, we report the results of a graphical analysis to check the perti-
nence of the fear for a future sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The analysis leaves
us with the feeling that at the end 2009 the probability of observing a Euro area
country defaulting is less important than six month earlier. Nevertheless, the
serious threats, concerning in particular Greece and Ireland, do not permit to
exclude the future occurrence of a contagious or self-fullling, sovereign debt or
currency crises in the Euro area.
Wether or not such a crisis occurs in the coming months, these debates should
tend to create a revival of studies on the relation between banking and sovereign
debt crises. The story is no more forgotten and it is certain that during the next
nancial turmoils, particular attention will be paid to the public accounts. The
fear of a potential sovereign debt crisis in Euro area, will also force European
authorities to update the legal framework to address such events, considering
that they are, after all, not so rare.
We can hope that this lesson will strengthen Euro area countries when facing
future crises.
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